Consider a sales contract, called a swing contract, between a seller and a buyer concerning some underlying commodity, with the contract specifying that during some future time interval the buyer will purchase an amount of the commodity between some specified minimum and maximum values. The purchase price and capacity at each time point is also prespecified in the contract. Assuming a random market price process and ignoring the possibility of storage, we look for the maximal expected net gain for the buyer of such a contract, and the strategy that achieves this maximal expected net gain. We study the effects that various contract constraints and market price processes have on the optimal strategy and on the contract value. We show how we can reduce the general swing contract to a multiple exercising of American (Bermudan) style options. Also, in important special cases, we give explicit expressions for the optimal contract value function and the optimal strategy.
Introduction
Swing contracts are widely used in the commodity markets, especially in the gas and electricity markets. Under a swing contract, the buyer is obliged to buy a specified minimum total amount of commodity, but has the freedom to buy up to a specified maximal total amount, during a specified time period. However, the purchase pattern over the period is at the buyer's choice, with minimum and maximum limits at any single time. Also, the commodity purchase prices (called strike prices) under the contract, specified at contract origination, may vary over the period.
This type of contract provides both the buyer and seller partial security about the future demand, supply, and pricing of the commodity. It also provides flexibility to the buyer on the timing and the amount of purchase over the period.
Throughout the paper, we assume no storage of commodity. This assumption is realistic for some commodities, such as electricity which has a high cost of storage. Also, we assume a highly liquid market for the commodity, so that market price is readily available and realizable. The buyer's net monetary gain from purchasing a unit amount of commodity at any time is taken to be the spot market price minus the strike price at that time. In this paper we assume that the buyer's objective is to maximize the expected total (discounted) monetary gains and to find the corresponding purchasing strategy that maximizes this expected total gain. Barbieri and Garman [2] , [3] gave descriptions of several variants of the swing contract, without details on how to value them. Deng [6] , Schwartz [12] , and Schwartz and James [13] provided some stochastic models of the spot market price processes. Carmona and Touzi [4] , and Carmona and Dayanic [5] obtained some structural results of the optimal strategy and the value function for put swings by using a stopping time approach. Ali et al. [1] and Jaillet et al. [7] considered swing contracts that allow the buyer to add or reduce purchase amounts from a base amount, and gave numerical approximations of the maximal contract value by first using the recombining trinomial or binomial tree approach to approximate the underlying commodity market price process, and then applying brute force dynamic programming to calculate the contract value. Pilipovic and Wengler [9] also discussed special cases of swing contracts which can be solved with simple procedures. Keppo [8] gave a mathematical formulation for finding the optimal strategy and the contract value function, assuming that the commodity could be traded continuously; he also provided some upper and lower bounds for the contract value function. In this paper we adopt Keppo's definition of swing contracts, except now we assume that the commodity is purchased at discrete-time grids. Algorithms to calculate the contract value by utilizing the structural results in this paper, as well as techniques for approximating continuous-time exercising contracts by their discrete-time counterparts, are contained in a separate paper by the authors [11] .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a mathematical description of the swing contract, as well as the dynamic programming formulation for the contract value function and the optimal strategy. In Section 3 we give some definitions that will be used throughout the paper. In Section 4 we give structural results on how the contract constraints affect the contract value and optimal strategy. In Section 5 we discuss how the spot market price affects both the contract value and the corresponding optimal strategy. Section 6 combines the results of Sections 4 and 5 to give a detailed description of the structure of the optimal strategy, as well as explicit expressions in special cases. This section also includes applications and extensions of results to the American call option. Section 7 includes the concluding remarks, possible extensions, and areas of future research. Some technical proofs of the theorems are deferred to Appendix A.
Model description and formulation
A swing contract normally specifies that over some future time grids 0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t n (where t n < T ), the buyer will buy a total amount of the commodity that is between u and u + v. We call u the obligatory amount and v the bonus amount. It also specifies the price K i (called the strike price) for a unit amount of purchase at time t i , i = 0, . . . , n, where K i may be different from K j if i = j . The contract also specifies the single purchasing limit M, i.e. the amount of purchase at any time grid t i must be between 0 and M. (While we assume that the commodities are in continuous form, we show that all results also apply to commodities with discrete counts as well.) Other than these constraints, the buyer can choose any purchasing amount at any time grid. The contract may also specify a lower purchasing limit at each time, but this constraint can be eliminated simply by considering the extra purchasing amount beyond this lower limit at each time.
On the structure of a swing contract's optimal value and optimal strategy 3 We will use C h i (u, v) to denote the subcontract that has the same parameters as the original contract, except now the purchasing opportunities are limited to the time grids t i , . . . , t h only (so C n 0 (u, v) is the original contract). We will omit the superscript h when h = n. So, after the buyer purchases q units of commodity at time t i for subcontract C h i (u, v) , the remaining subcontract is
, where x + = max(x, 0) and x − = max(−x, 0). For contract C i (u, v) , the amount of purchase at time t i must be in the feasible set U i (u, v 
to denote the range of the total amount that the buyer can possibly buy during [t i , t n ], and use D i to denote the total amounts that the buyer can possibly buy after time t i , i.e. D i = R i+1 .
The buyer's net gain by purchasing one unit of commodity from the seller at time t i is S i −K i , where S i is the spot market price and K i is the strike price. We will assume that the spot market price process {S(t) : t ≥ 0} is a single-factor Markov process. This assumption is satisfied by most price process models in the papers mentioned previously.
From the above discussions we see that the state of the system at time t i can be summarized by the triplet (u, v, s), where s is the spot market price for the commodity at that time and the remaining contract is C i (u, v) . Let r be the risk-free interest rate that, for simplicity, is assumed to be constant throughout the paper.
Assuming that the buyer's objective is to maximize his/her expected total (discounted) net gain over the contract lifetime, let H i (u, v, s) be the maximal expected total remaining net gain (discounted to t i ) when the state at time t i is (u, v, s) (so H 0 (u, v, s) is the contract value function at contract origination). Define 1 A = 1 if statement A is true, and 1 A = 0 otherwise. Then, at contract maturity, we have
, where [X | A] denotes the random variable X given that event A is true. Now, for i = 0, . . . , n − 1, we define θ i+1 ≡ t i+1 − t i and
Then the contract value function at time t i is
We will use q i (u, v, s) to denote the maximizer in the above iteration formula. If there are multiple solutions, the maximizer is defined to be the smallest solution.
Definitions and notation
We will use f (x) ↑ x to mean that f is nondecreasing in x, where x may be single or multidimensional, and use x ≤ y to mean that each component of x is smaller than or equal to the corresponding component of y. We use f (x) ↑ x a to mean that f is nondecreasing in x (one-dimensional) and has limit a as x tends to ∞. We define f (x) ↓ x and f (x) ↓ x a similarly.
We will use A c to denote the complement of event A.
Definition. For a bivariate function f (x, y), define 1. f (x, y) to be submodular if
On the structure of a swing contract's optimal value and optimal strategy 5 Suppose that there are two swing contracts, C 1,i (·, ·) (contract 1) and C 2,i (·, ·) (contract 2). The only difference between the two contracts is that, for contract 1 and some I ∈ {0, . . . , n}, there is an additional purchasing opportunity at timeT ∈ (t I , t I +1 ) (assuming that t n+1 = T ).
Let the value functions for contracts 1 and 2 be H 1 i and H 2 i , respectively. Then we have the following result.
Theorem 2. For
Proof. See Appendix A.
A Markov process is homogeneous if [S(t) | S(0) = x] has the same distribution as
By treating contract
in Theorem 2, we have the following result.
Corollary 2. If K i = K and θ i = θ for all i, and the commodity price process {S(t) : t ≥ 0} is a homogeneous Markov Process, then
H i (u, v, s) is submodular in (i, u), and in (i, v) when u = 0, q i (u, v, s) ↑ i .
Linearity
Based on previous results, we will show that the problem of computing the contract value and the optimal strategy can be reduced to the special case of when both u and v are multiples of M. In this case the optimal strategy will be a 'bang-bang' strategy, i.e. at each time grid, either we buy M, or we do not buy at all. To prove this, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 1.
Assume that kM + jM + x + y ∈ R i , where k and j are integers, and that
Remark. Lemma 1 shows that the optimal purchase amount would be among one of the four special values. If the commodity is counted unit by unit (e.g. packages) instead of having continuous form (e.g. electricity) then, by assuming that the commodities can be purchased with fractional amount, the optimal purchase amount will still be an integer as long as u, v, and M are integers. This is a strategy that is achievable under the constraint that the purchasing amount cannot be fractional. So both forms of commodity will have the same optimal strategy and contract value function. Because of this, we continue to assume that the commodity has continuous form. From Lemma 1 we immediately find, when the obligatory and bonus amounts are both multiples of the single purchasing limit M, that the optimal purchasing amount is equal to either 0 or the maximum allowed amount M at that time. 
.
So, once we know the contract value function H i (kM, j M, s) for all feasible integers k and j , we can calculate the value of other swing contracts as well.
Based on Theorems 3 and 4, we will assume that M = 1, and that u = k and v = j (both are integers) in the following. So the contract becomes similar to that of the American call option, though more complicated. The purchasing decision is now binary: either we buy or we wait till the next purchasing opportunity.
Properties on the spot market price
In Section 4 we showed how the contract constraints affect the optimal strategy and contract value function. All the results we have shown hold for all single-factor Markov price processes, except in Corollary 2 where we needed the price processes to be homogeneous. Now we show how the commodity price process affects the optimal strategy and the contract value function.
Preliminary
Before we proceed, it is convenient for us to introduce some basic concepts in probability and stochastic ordering.
For any random vector X, let F X be its distribution function, i.e. F X (x) = P(X ≤ x) for all x. Define X d = Y if the random vectors X and Y have the same distribution function. Define 
For a random variable set
Shaked and Shanthikumar [14, p. 4] provided the following result.
For all time grids t i , we assume the following in the discussions below:
i+1 < ∞ and continuous in s;
Monotonicity of the spot market price
Now we give the structural relationship between the optimal strategy and the spot market price.
Theorem 5.
On k ∈ R i , the following assertions hold.
Examples
Assume that {B t : t ≥ 0} is a standard Brownian motion started at 0, having drift parameter 0, and volatility parameter 1. Let {S s t } t≥0 be the market price process starting at s; we will omit the superscript 's' when it does not generate confusion. We will assume that S s t ↑ st s for all t. This assumption can be shown to be satisfied for all continuous Markov price processes, including all the examples provided below. Now we provide some concrete market price process examples within which the conditions of Theorem 5 are satisfied. These examples and their extensions are widely used in various commodity market price process models (see Section 1 for references). 
Example 1. (Decaying price process.) Suppose that the price process S t is described by dS t = (rS t − δ(t, S t )) dt + σ (t, S t ) dB

When δ(t, s) = (κ(t) + r)s − κ(t)µ(t)
, we have the following result.
Example 2. (Mean reverting process.) If the price process follows dS t = κ(t)(µ(t) − S t ) dt + σ (t, S t ) dB t , κ(t) ≥ 0,
where κ(·) ≥ 0 and µ(·) ≥ 0, then E e −rt S s t − s ↓ s for all t.
When δ(t, s) = (r − µ)s and σ (t, s)
= σ s, we have the following result.
Example 3. (Geometric Brownian motion.) If the price process follows dS t = µS t dt + σ S t dB t ,
where µ and σ are both constants, then E e −rt S s t − s ↑ s if µ ≥ r and E e −rt S s t − s ↓ s if µ ≤ r.
Boundary results
When current price is high enough, the optimal value function and strategy becomes simple, as shown in Theorem 6. The results can be trivially proved by backward induction.
Theorem 6.
For i ≤ n − 1 and k + j ∈ R i , the following assertions hold.
Therefore, lim s→∞ q i (k, j, s) = 1.
Optimal strategy structure
Combining the results from the previous sections, we will provide a detailed structure of the optimal strategy in this section. Since the American call option (or more accurately, the Bermudan option) is a special case of the swing contract with k = 0 and j = 1, then the results we obtain here also apply to the American call option (with time-dependent strike prices).
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General swing contract
We have assumed that once the commodity price becomes 0, all its future prices will stay at 0. In this case the optimal strategy can be determined easily.
Let Combining Theorems 1, 5, and 6, and Lemma 3, we can prove the following result.
Note that the s i ≡ s i (k, j ) in Theorem 7 are finite and functions of (k, j ). We omit this functional relationship where it is evident. Based on Theorem 1,
Theorem 7 implies the following result.
Corollary 3. Assume that
K i = K for all i and that k ∈ D i . 1. If E exp(−rθ i+1 )S i,s i+1 ≥ s for all i and s then q i (k, 0, s) = q i (0, k, s) = 0 for all s. 2. If E exp(−rθ i+1 )S i,s i+1 − s ↓ s −∞ for all i then q i (k, j, s) = 1 (s>s i ) for some s i . 3. If E exp(−rθ i+1 )S i,s i+1 = s for all i and s then q i (k, j, s) = 1 (s>s i ,k+j =n−i+1) for some s i = s i (k) ∈ (0, K] and s i (0) = K.
American call option
In this subsection we assume that the market price process follows a geometric Brownian motion, and we are interested in an American call option with time-dependent strike prices.
When µ ≥ r and the strike prices are equal at all times, the optimal strategy is well known: wait till maturity and then buy if and only if the market price is above the strike price; when the strike prices are different, we have the following 'interval' optimal strategy. q i (0, 1, s) . Then the following assertions hold.
V i (s) − s is convex in s and reaches a minimum at some
Theorem 8 implies that, under some situations, it is optimal to exercise the option immediately if and only if the current price is within some interval.
Proof of Theorem 8. See Appendix A.
Conclusion
In this paper we proved that we can transform the general swing contract into an American style option that specifies the minimum and maximum numbers of exercising opportunities. We have shown the monotonicity relationship between the optimal strategy and the contract constraints as well as the market price processes. By examining the optimal strategy as the price goes to ∞, we found that the optimal strategies for the swing contract have simple threshold policies under some conditions on the market price process, and we gave widely used market price process examples in which these conditions were satisfied. For an American call option, when the discounted price process drifts upwards and the strike prices are time varying, we showed that the optimal strategy is of interval type.
In a separate paper by the authors (see [11] ), we utilized the structure of the optimal strategy given in this paper to develop computational techniques for calculating the swing contract value function. In that paper we also obtained bounds on how far our estimator is from the true contract value. In the case when the commodity was purchased continuously (e.g. electricity) over time, we showed how the swing contract value could be approximated by its discrete counterpart. This paper also discussed the issue of a nonhomogeneous purchasing capacity and interest rate.
The techniques we developed for proving properties of the swing contract can be extended to other American style options with relatively few state variables as well. The swing contract we considered in this paper is of call type; another group of swing contracts are put type, where the contract owner has the right to sell commodity at specified strike prices. Parallel results can be derived for the put type contracts.
On the structure of a swing contract's optimal value and optimal strategy 11 Let g(x, y) = f (x−q(x, y), y) = max{f (x−q, y) : q ∈ U (x, y)], then we have the following result. a(x 1 , y 2 ) = max(a(x 1 , y 1 ), a(x 2 , y 2 
Lemma 5. (a) If f (x, y) is submodular and
(a) Note that conditions (1) and (2) imply that
The submodularity of f (x, y) implies that f (x −q, y) is supermodular in (q, y), so q(x, y) ↑ y , by Lemma 4.
For any x 1 < x 2 and y 1 < y 2 , if 
Symmetrically, f (x, y) ∈ F 21 if and only if, for all h 1 , h 2 > 0,
The interrelationships between submodularity, concavity, and the F 12 and F 21 properties are given by the following result. For a bivariate function f (x, y) , the following assertions hold. (4) and (5), we obtain
Lemma 6.
(a) If f (x, y) ∈ F 12 F 21 then f (x, r − x) is concave in x ∈ [0, r].f (x, y + h 1 + h 2 ) + f (x + h 1 + h 2 , y) ≤ f (x + h 1 , y + h 2 ) + f (x + h 2 , y + h 1 ).
This is equivalent to the concavity of f (x, r − x).
Parts (b) and (c) can be proved similarly.
Lemma 7. (a) If f (x, y) ∈ F 12 and, for all h
then g ∈ F 12 and q(k, j ) ∈ F 1 . y) is submodular, and a(x, y) =â(x) and b(x, y) =b(x + y),
Also, conditions (6) and (7) imply that
So, Lemma 4 implies that q(x, z − x) ↑ x ; thus, q(x, y) ∈ F 1 .
For h 1 , h 2 > 0, similar to the proof of Lemma 5, we can show that if q(x, y + h 2 ) + h 1 ≥ q(x+h 1 +h 2 , y) then q(x, y+h 2 ) ∈ U(x+h 2 , y) and q(x+h 1 +h 2 , y) ∈ U(x+h 1 , y+h 2 ). If otherwise then q(x, y +h 2 )+h 1 ∈ U(x+h 1 , y+h 2 ) and q(x +h 1 +h 2 , y)−h 1 ∈ U(x+h 2 , y). Similar to the proof of Lemma 5, we can show that, in both cases,
14 S. M. ROSS AND Z. ZHU For I < n. By purchasing the same amount for C 1,I (u + h, v) (maybe suboptimal) as for C 1,I (u, v) under the optimal strategy at timeT and then using the concavity of
Then (8) 
